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their clients' tax liability with the Internal Revenue Service on a more
extensive basis than the state courts now permit.
HERBERT S. FALK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-State Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations for Collection of Use Taxes
Defendant, a Delaware corporation, occasionally sold furniture to
Maryland residents who came to defendant's Delaware store to make
purchases. Some of the purchases were consigned to Maryland addresses and shipped by common carrier, while others were delivered
directly to Maryland customers by defendant's truck. Defendant was
not qualified or registered to do business in Maryland, maintained no
branch office or agencies there, and solicited no orders from Maryland
residents through traveling salesmen, mail or telephone. The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the Delaware corporation was engaged in business in the state within the meaning of the Maryland use
tax statute,' and consequently liable for the collection of the use tax 2
from its Maryland customers. 3 In reversing the Maryland court, the
United States Supreme Court (four justices dissenting) held that
Maryland had no jurisdiction over defendant corporation, and, therefore, to require it to collect a use tax was a violation of due process. 4
In previous cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may
'MD. ANN. CoDa, art. 81 § 371 (1951) provides: "Every vendor engaged in
business in this state and making sales of tangible personal property for use,
storage or consumption in this state which are taxable under the provisions of
this subtitle, at the time of making such sales, or if the use, storage or consumption becomes taxable hereunder, shall collect the tax imposed by this sub-title
from the purchaser." 368(k) of the same act defines the term "engaged in
business in this state" as selling or delivering in the state, or any activity in
connection therewith, tangible personal property for use, storage or consumption
within the state.
2 The purpose of the use tax is to complement and support the sales tax,
usually in two respects. First, it protects state merchants from competition with
out-of-state merchants whose sales are not taxed, and second, it prevents the
loss of state revenue by removing from its residents the advantage of non-taxed
out-of-state purchases.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 201 Md. 535, 95 A 2d 286 (1953).
Maryland entered suit against defendant to recover use taxes assessed by the
state comptroller and attached a station wagon belonging to defendant. Defendant filed a petition to quash the writ of attachment on the grounds that the
assessment was unconstitutional. In holding that the defendant was subject
to the use tax statute the court relied on the fact that it delivered merchandise
to purchasers in Maryland. Other factors advanced on argument for holding
defendant liable were as follows: (a) Defendant delivered some purchases to
common carriers consigned to Maryland addresses. (b) It occasionally mailed
sales circulars to all former customers, including Maryland customers. (c) It
advertised with Delaware papers and radio stations knowing that such advertisements would reach Maryland inhabitants.
'Miller Brothers v. State of Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 342 (1954) : "Seizure
of property by the state under pretext of taxation when there is no jurisdiction
or power to tax is simple- confiscation and a denial of due process of law."
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require a foreign corporation to collect a use tax on goods destined
for the use of residents of the taxing state, where the vendor shipped
to an agent in the state for delivery, 5 engaged in intrastate business
as well as interstate activities there, 6 rented offices for general agents
within the state, 7 or merely dispatched soliciting agents thereto.8
Likewise, the Court has sustained statutes making foreign corporations liable for the collection of a sales tax where they maintained offices in the taxing state.0 But the Court reached a different conclusion
as to a sales tax in McLeod v. Dilworth,10 the apparent distinction
Monomotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934).
'Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359 (1941); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U. S. 373 (1941). The question in these cases was
whether Iowa could require the companies involved to collect a use tax on orders
sent directly from Iowa customers to out-of-state mail order houses and filled by
shipment direct to those purchasers by mail or common carrier. In holding that
the state could do so, the Court took the view that the mail order business was
a general business being done as a whole through the companies' local stores
and otherwise in the state; and also, since the sellers were doing business in the
state, they were subject to its territorial jurisdiction.
7 Felt and Tarrent Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939). Agents in
this case had the exclusive right to solicit orders in. California, and had authority
to employ sub-agents. Sometimes orders were filled by shipment from the outof-state office directly to the customer, and at other times shipment was made
to the agents for subsequent delivery.
'General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U. S. 335 (1944).
Defendant was not qualified to do business in Iowa and maintained no office
or permanent agents therein. The extent of its activity consisted of sending
traveling salesmen from Minnesota into Iowa where they solicited orders subject to acceptance or rejection at the Minnesota office. Orders were filled by
shipping merchandise to Iowa customers by common carrier or mail. This case
is generally regarded as the Supreme Court's most liberal extension of the power
of a state over an out-of-state corporation with respect to making it a collector
of the use tax. For a discussion of the case see, Note, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1086
(1944) and Roesken, State Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporationsfor Collection
of Use Taxes, 22 TAXEs 296 (1944). To date, at least two states have indicated reluctance to follow the General Trading Co. case: In Creamery Package
Mfg. Co. v. State Board of Equilization, 62 Wyo. 265, 166 P. 2d 952 (1946),
the Wyoming court distinguished a similar fact situation in finding that the
Wyoming use tax statute did not define "retailers doing business within the
state" to include foreign corporations dispatching agents into the state; and
in Richmond Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Miss. 122, 37 So. 2d 22 (1948), the
Mississippi court held that the procedural rule that a corporation must he
doing business within the state for the purpose of service of process, prevented
the state from having jurisdiction over the plaintiff corporation, the reasoning
being that Mississippi decisions do not consider that the mere presence of
soliciting agents within a state constitutes doing business within the procedural
rule. But for an indication that the procedural rule may be losing force,
see Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 311 (1945); Johns v. Bay State
Abrasive Product Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (1950); Compania de Astral, S. A.
v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A. 2d 357 (Md. 1954); Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture
Labs., 257 P. 2d 727 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1953); Jeter v Austin Trailer Equip.
Co., 265 P. 2d 130 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1954). The General Trading Co. case
was applied favorably in People v. West Pub. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80, 216 P. 2d 441
(1950).
McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940); McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U. S. 70 (1940).
10322 U. S. 327 (1944). The only differenuce between the facts of this case
and those of General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U. S.
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being that in the former cases the transfer of title and consummation
of sale took place within the taxing state; whereas, in the latter case,
title was found to pass upon delivery to the carrier in the vendor's
state.
In addition to the due process problem, a major barrier which the
states had to overcome in all of these cases was the question of the
effect of the statutes with respect to the commerce clause. The general rule is that a state must not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce."
Thus, among other things, a state is prevented
from singling out interstate commerce for special tax burdens;12 subjecting it to cumulative taxes of similar nature;13 taxing the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce;14 and discriminating against interstate commerce in favor of its local trade.'5
A tax may fall if it affects interstate commerce in any of the above
mentioned ways, even when there is sufficient contact between the taxed
incident and the taxing state to satisfy the due process requirement.
335 (1944), is that the tax involved in the General Trading Co. case was a use
tax, while here the tax involved was a sales tax. Obviously, it is a case where

the Court looked more at the labels than the economic incidents of the two taxes.
See McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 332 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ; McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 349 (1944) (Mr. Justice Rutledge combines
dissenting opinion in the Dilworth case and concurring opinion in the General
Trading Co. case.)
" "Despite mechanical or artificial distinctions sometimes taken between the
taxes deemed permissible and those condemned, the decisions appear to be predicated on a practical judgment as to the likelihood of the tax being used to place
interstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage." Galveston, H. &. S. A. R. R.
v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
' McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940).
". International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 (1918); Looney
v. Crane, 245 U. S. 178 (1917); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. O'Connor, 223
U. S. 280 (1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1909). In
these cases the Court held that a license fee based on a percentage of the entire
capital stock of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce was an undue
burden, since each state in which the corporation did business could impose a
tax measured by all of its interstate business. The Court has also struck down
taxes on gross receipts derived from interstate business on the theory that every
state in which the corporation engaged in business could similarly tax its gross
receipts. Gwin, White, & Prince v. Hennefore, 305 U. S. 434 (1939); J. F.
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Galveston, H. & S. A. R. R.
v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); Philadelphia & S. M. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887).
But.taxes have been sustained when apportioned to capital resulting from intrastate business. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331 (1939) ; International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U. S. 429 (1929); National Leather Co. v.
Massachusetts, 277 U. S. 413 (1928). In International Harvester Co. v. Dep't
of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944), and Dep't of Treasury v. Wood Preserving
Co., 313 U. S. 62 (1941), the Court refused to consider the problem of cumulative taxation in holding that a state could tax gross receipts from interstate
transactions taking place within its borders.
"'Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Washington, 297 U. S. 403
(1936).
8

" Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62 (1891).
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So, though somewhat overlapping, the questions of due process and
the commerce clause are not identical.' 6
In the instant case, the Court did not rule on the commerce question, but based the decision on its opinion that the conduct of the
Delaware corporation was not of such character as to bring it within
Maryland's taxing power. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas (The
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark concurring)
urged that the defendant's frequent delivery of goods into Maryland, its
knowledge as to the destination of goods shipped by common carrier,
and its regular injection of advertising into media reaching Maryland
residents established sufficient contact with the state to form a basis
for requiring the defendant to collect the tax.
The principle that in such case there must be some intrastate activity on the part of the foreign vendor appears fundamental. But the
members of the Court disagree as to the degree of activity necessary,
and decisions to date fail to establish any clear-cut formula for determining when intrastate activities are sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.' 7 Perhaps, in speaking of the lack of invasion and exploitation
of the consumer market in the instant case, Mr. justice Jackson gives
some indication as to a very important part of the test,18 and it may
well be that some form of aggressive, active competition with the local
market, coupled with an entry such as in the instant case, would establish the necessary jurisdiction. Such a test is consistent with previous
decisions,' 0 and might be justified on the theory that the state is entitled to compensation for furnishing a market in which the out-of"MMcLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U. S. 327, 349, 353 (1944) (Mr. Justice Rutledge combines dissenting opinion in the Dilworth case and concurring opinion
in the General Trading Co. case).
1' It should be noted that discussion here is limited to activities which bring
a foreign corporation within a state's jurisdiction with respect to collecting the
use tax. For a discussion of intrastate activities sufficient to require a foreign
corporation to domesticate as compared with those sufficient for service of process, see Note, 45 Mica. L. REv. 218 (1946). Recent Supreme Court extensions of the procedural rule that a foreign corporation must be doing businesswithin a state for purpose of service of process are discussed in Note, 7 Alum.
L. R v. 403 (1953); Note, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 500 (1951).
18 In distinguishing General Trading Co., where soliciting agents were sent
into the taxing state, Mr. Justice Jackson said, "The Court could properly approve the state's decision to regard such rivalry with its local merchants as
equivalent to being a local merchant. But there is a wide gulf between this
type of active and aggressive operation within a taxing state and the occasional
delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation other than
incidental effects of general advertising. Here was no invasion or exploitation
of the consumer market in Maryland. On the contrary, these sales resulted
from purchasers traveling from Maryland to Delaware to exploit its less taxburdened selling market." Miller Brothers v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 347
(1954).
1" In all cases cited in footnotes 4 through 7, there was local solicitation in
some form.
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state corporation receives the same benefits and protection as intrastate vendors. 20
If such an analysis is correct, the decision should have little practical effect upon the present administration and collection of use taxes, 21
because the way will have been left open to impose tax collecting obligations on foreign corporations which make deliveries into a taxing
state after encroaching upon its markets by inducing (e.g., by direct
advertising, mail and telephone solicitation, etc.) its customers to cross
the state line for tax-saving purposes. On the other hand, if this
decision means that such corporations may now escape liability, its
effect will no doubt be to increase the number of merchants seeking
to capitalize on the sales tax of neighboring states at the expense of
the local market, thereby further increasing the difficulties of administration and collection of the use tax.
WILLIAm

E. GRAHAM, JR.

Constitutional Law-Equal Protection Clause-Exclusion of a Class
from Jury Service
Twenty years ago the United States Supreme Court decided that
discrimination of a nature prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution' occurs
when it is shown by a Negro defendant that for a generation or longer
no person of African descent has been called for jury service although
qualified Negroes are available within the county wherein the trial
is held.2 The rule is sometimes referred to as the "Norris" rule.
Recently in Hernandez v. Texas,, the Court was faced with the
" In People v. West Pub. Co., 35 Cal. 2d 80, 91, 216 P. 2d 441, 448 (1950),
the California Supreme Court held the defendant publishing company liable for

the collection of the use tax where it maintained offices and soliciting agents
within the state. In so holding, the court used the following language: "The
state provided a market in which appellant operated in competition with local
law book publishers, and its salesmen received the same protection and other
benefits from the state as salesmen carrying on business activities for a company engaged in intrastate business."

21 Of course, the decision might have some effect because the collection of
the use tax through the vendor is the most effective method of enforcing the
tax and the decision exempts one *class of foreign vendors from that responsibility. However, at present few state statutes are as broad as the Maryland
statute in defining companies "engaged in business within the state," but they
are, for the most part, directed at foreign corporations maintaining places of
business within the state or engaging in some form of local solicitation or advertising.
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person
within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
2 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
No Negro had served on the
jury within the memory of witnesses who had lived in the county for life. The
pronounced rule is one of presumption, and may be overcome by a sufficient
showing of facts by the state.
374 Sup. Ct. 667 (1954).

